Introduction
Secure two-party computation (2PC) allows two parties to evaluate a function on private inputs, and learn only the output of the function. Standard security definitions for secure computation provide extremely strong cryptographic guarantees. In many situations it is reasonable to consider relaxing these guarantees if it results in a significantly faster protocol.
In this work, we consider relaxing security by allowing the protocol to leak some "extra" information. This raises the question, what extra information is reasonable to leak without completely undermining the idea of secure computation? A natural candidate is to leak only differentially private (DP) information about the private inputs. Differential privacy [8] ensures that the adversary obtains similar leakage, whether a particular individual's information was used in the computation or not.
Our Contributions
We show a sizeable tradeoff between performance and differentially private leakage in the setting of private set intersection (PSI). In PSI, two parties have input sets X and Y , and wish to learn (only) their intersection X ∩Y . Differential privacy is an especially good match for this problem, since many of its most notable applications involve sets of individuals. For example, the application of private contact discovery in social networks involves a client with a small set of email addresses (i.e., address book), and a server with a large set of user email addresses, who compute the corresponding intersection. Differential privacy in this setting would ensure that, e.g., the server cannot learn whether a particular user Charlie was present in the client's address book.
Our starting point is the protocol of Rindal & Rosulek [26] , which is the fastest malicious-secure PSI protocol to date. Like many PSI protocols (especially in the tradition of [10] ), this one works by first having the parties hash their items into bins (e.g., item x is placed in bin h(x)), and a smaller PSI is performed in each bin. When using hashing, dummy items must be added to fill each bin to a maximum size. This is because the number of true items in each bin is information that cannot be inferred from the intersection alone (i.e., it is leakage from a security standpoint). Unfortunately, dummy items vastly outnumber real items, and so contribute the majority of the protocol's cost.
Instead of completely hiding the load of the bins (by padding with dummy items to an upper bound), we can consider releasing a differentially-private estimate of the load. Furthermore, this estimate must be an overestimate of the true load, in order to preserve correctness of the PSI output. The challenge is to design a "differentially-private load overestimate" mecha-nism that is as close to the true load as possible, thereby minimizing the number of dummy items. 1 The idea of differentially-private over-estimates of the true bin load has been used previously in the context of PSI (and private record linkage) protocols (e.g., [12] ). As we show, the specific mechanism used in prior work is less effective when the load in each bin is rather small (e.g., typically [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , as is the case here. Hence, we introduce two improved mechanisms (i.e., better accuracy) for load overestimation. We consider these new mechanisms in the context of the [26] PSI protocol, but they can be used to give coresponding improvement in [12] and in other work unrelated to PSI (e.g., [16] ). Our first mechanism improves accuracy by leveraging the fact that the load of a bin follows a known binomial distribution. Our second mechanism is a simple rounding approach (round the number of items in a bin up to either t 1 or t 2 ) that gives even better performance. Since this second mechanism is deterministic, it does not achieve standard differential privacy, but we show that it provides a guarantee known as distributional differential privacy (DDP) [1] . The DDP model applies when the adversary has sufficient uncertainty in the sensitive data. We discuss how to interpret DDP and assess its applicability for PSI in Section 5.3.
On the theoretical side, we introduce a security model for malicious-secure MPC with differentially private leakage. Previous work combining MPC and differential privacy (starting with [2] ) considered only the semi-honest setting, which masks some important subtleties that we discuss. We prove that a straightforward generalization of the [26] protocol is a secure PSI protocol against malicious adversaries in this model, when using any suitable private load-overestimate function.
Finally, we have incorporated our new techniques into the implementation of [26] to present a thorough empirical analysis of the tradeoff between privacy and performance. Allowing differentially private leakage improves the performance of the protocol by 33% (for a relatively strict = 0.5 guarantee) to 63% (for a weaker = 4 guarantee). Allowing = 0.33 distributionally DP leakage for the sender (and = 1 standard DP for the receiver) improves the performance by 52% over the fully secure variant.
1 One can think of the fully-secure protocol of [26] as a protocol that uses a very pessimistic load overestimate which leaks nothing about the true load.
Related Work
Trading leakage for performance in generic MPC. The dual execution paradigm, introduced by Mohassel & Franklin [19] and extended in other work [13, 17] , relaxes the malicious security model by allowing the adversary to learn an arbitrary bit about the honest party's input. The resulting protocol is only 2× the cost of a standard semi-honest protocol. The dual execution paradigm can be used to securely evaluate any functionality, but does not guarantee that the leakage satisfies any meaningful privacy limitation (other than being 1 bit). Our approach also relaxes security by allowing some leakage, but in the specific case of PSI we ensure that the leakage is differentially private.
Beimel et al. [2] explored a model of MPC where the standard privacy guarantee is replaced by the natural differentially private analog. This security model is inherently tied to the semi-honest adversarial setting, and not suitable for our malicious setting. We believe our security model more clearly separates the different intuitive security goals of MPC and makes it explicit which goals are ensured in a cryptographic or differentially private sense (e.g., we enforce correctness in the standard sense but input independence and privacy in a differentially private sense).
Trading leakage for performance in specialpurpose MPC. The most closely related work to ours is that of He et al. [12] . They study the problem of private record linkage (a generalization of private set intersection) with differentially private leakage. They include several approaches that degrade the correctness of the result -we do not consider these approaches since we focus on computing the intersection exactly. Their technique that preserves exact correctness uses a similar high-level approach to ours, with "differentially private load overestimates." However, we show that their technique (also used in [16] ) is less effective when applied to the PSI protocol of [26] and realistic privacy parameters. Our new mechanisms for the same problem have significantly better accuracy (i.e., fewer dummy items) and lead to significant performance improvement. Our mechanisms could easily be used in their protocol for a corresponding improvement.
Another notable instance of trading leakage for performance is in the context of searchable encryption, and more generally secure database search. The encrypted database systems BlindSeer [24] and that of Cash et al. [5] provide standard database (DBMS) functionality, while hiding the nature of the query from the server with the exception of some leaked information.
Schoppmann et al.
[27] perform nearest neighbor queries on a private database, while allowing differentially private leakage. As in our work, this leakage is tailored to the protocol and specific functionality.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [11, 22] refers to a protocol between a client and server that allows the client to read/write its data held by the server, but hiding the client's access pattern from the server. Some relatively recent work [6, 18, 28] has explored relaxing the obliviousness requirement of ORAM to allow the server to learn only differentially private information about the access pattern. Similar to our work, the goal is to compute a "plain" functionality with the standard notion of correctness -i.e., without adding any noise. In this case, the functionality corresponds to RAM read/write instructions; in our case the functionality is PSI.
In all works in this section, the security model is honest-but-curious whereas we consider the malicious security setting.
Securely Computing Differentially-Private Functions.
There is a great deal of work on using secure computation to evaluate a differentially-private mechanism -e.g., [3, 7, 14, 23, 25] -including protocols for closely related functionalities like cardinality of set intersection cardinality [20] and union [9] . In these works, the focus is to compute a differentially-private functionality, under a standard security notion. In other words, the parties learn only a differentially private answer, while in our work the parties learn a non-differentially private function, plus some additional (incidental) differentially private information.
Differential Privacy Background
Differential privacy [8] is a condition meant to ensure that releases from large databases do not violate the privacy of any of the individuals whose data that database contains. In particular, let X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) be a database of information about n individuals, with X i being the data corresponding to the i th individual. A query is a (possibly randomized) function f that takes a database as input. Differential privacy ensures that the inclusion of individual i in the database does not allow an adversary to infer anything about them.
The strength of the definition is controlled by a parameter . Intuitively, differential privacy guarantees that whatever f (X) outputs, that output would have been roughly equally likely even if any individual had instead changed their data arbitrarily. See [15] for a rigorous treatment.
More formally, we say that two databases X and X are neighboring if they differ only in the addition or deletion of a single value. We can then define differential privacy.
Definition 1.
A query function f is -differentially private ( -DP) if for any two neighboring databases X and X and for any set S of possible outputs, we have
Differential privacy also benefits from composition. That is, if f is 1 -differentially private and g is 2 -differentially private, the function h that gives both their outputs (i.e., Differential privacy is also preserved by any additional post-processing. That is, if f is -differentially private, then so is g • f for any g. This means anything that can be computed from a private output (with additional access to the database) is itself private. This, like composition, is useful both because it's an intuitively desirable property of a privacy definition and because it's useful in practice when designing private queries.
There are differentially private mechanisms that approximate a wide variety of naturally desirable functions. In the most simple query algorithms, the output is simply equal to the desired (non-private) output plus some carefully calibrated noise. In particular, say that F is some function on databases with output in R n . We define the sensitivity F to be the maximum amount of change F can see when one row of the database is changed.
Definition 2.
The sensitivity of a function F with output in R n is max F (X) − F (X ) , where the maximum is taken over all neighboring databases X and X and the norm is an 1 norm.
Our techniques rely primarily on several uses of the Laplace mechanism. This uses random noises generated according to a Laplace distribution, a double-sided exponential distribution. 3 Security model
UC-Secure 2-party Computation
We define security for 2-party computation using the Universal Composition (UC) framework of [4] . The formal details of this model are beyond the scope of this work, but we present a brief summary here.
Informally, security is defined in the real/ideal paradigm. A protocol is deemed secure if, for any attack against the protocol, there is an equivalent attack in an "ideal" world where the function is computed by a trusted third party.
In more detail, the UC model considers the following entities: Functionalities are trusted third parties who cannot be corrupted, and who carry out a specific behavior in response to commands/inputs from parties. Parties execute a specified protocol interacting with each other, the environment, and functionalities. Adversaries corrupt parties, and cause them to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. In this work we consider static security, where the identity of corrupt parties is decided before the interaction starts, and parties cannot become corrupted during the execution of the protocol. The environment is an arbitrary program that chooses the inputs of honest parties, receives their outputs, and interacts arbitrarily with the adversary.
Suppose π is a protocol (i.e., π is the program that describes the behavior of the honset parties). We allow protocols to be hybrid protocols in the sense that π can instruct parties to send messages to each other and also interact with a trusted functionality G. We write uc(π, G, A, Z, κ) to denote the output of an interaction between: honest parties running protocol π, functionality G, adversary A (possibly corrupting some of the parties), and environment program Z, all with common security parameter κ. The output is defined as the terminal output of Z. 
is negligible in κ. Here π dummy is the so-called dummy protocol where parties simply relay inputs from the environment directly to the functionality, and relay outputs from the functionality directly to the environment.
Intuitively, the goal of Z (with the help of A) is to determine whether it is controlling honest parties who run the protocol (the first, "real-world" interaction), or communicating directly with the functionality F (the second, "ideal-world" interaction).
The role of the simulator S is two-fold: (1) it must provide to A messages that look like protocol messages from honest parties running π, without knowing the honest parties' inputs -only seeing outputs given by F. (2) it must observe A's protocol messages and "extract" meaning from them, so that it can send appropriate inputs to F that induce correct outputs of honest parties (since Z sees these outputs).
UC Security with Differentially Private Leakage
Prior Work. Prior work (e.g., [2, 12, 27] ) introduces security definitions for secure computation with differentially private leakage. All of these works consider only security against semi-honest adversaries (i.e., adversaries who still follow the protocol), while in this work we consider security against malicious adversaries (who may deviate from the protocol). The semi-honest setting is significantly simpler from a definition standpoint.
To understand why, let's consider the security definition given in [12] as a concrete representative example of these prior works. For simplicity, consider only security against a corrupt Bob. Their definition of security is as follows: for all inputs y for Bob, and for all x, x Parameters:
Behavior:
If no parties are corrupt:
1. Wait for inputs x 1 from P 1 and x 2 from P 2 2. Deliver output f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) to P 1 and f 2 
If any party is corrupt, let P c denote the corrupt party and P h denote the honest party. Then:
where which are "neighbors" in the DP sense, and that satisfy f (x, y) = f (x , y), consider the distribution of Bob's view when the parties run honestly with inputs (x, y) vs (x , y). Instead of requiring these view distributions to be indistinguishable (as in standard 2PC security), they require only that these two view distributions to be close in a differentially-private sense. More precisely, the randomized function that generates Bob's view, from Alice's private input, is differentially private.
Challenges of Malicious Security. Generalizing these existing definitions to the malicious setting is not trivial. In particular, there are several problems that are encountered. First, note how in the semi-honest model, even a corrupt Bob's input y is fixed before the interaction starts. It is therefore possible to quantify over inputs x, x for Alice such that f (x, y) = f (x , y). In the malicious model, the input of a corrupt party is not welldefined in the real interaction. Even in the ideal interaction, the input is not determined until the simulator extracts it. To see one example of why this could be a problem, consider a protocol that leaks differentiallyprivate information about x to Bob early in the protocol, before Bob becomes bound to his own input. Our protocol indeed has this property, and it allows Bob's choice of input to depend on Alice's. Intuitively, malicioussecure 2PC guarantees not only privacy (the protocol leaks no more than f (x, y)) but it also guarantees input independence (Bob must choose y independently of x). We may wish to consider protocols that degrade the input-independence guarantee -not only the privacy guarantee -in a differentially-private way! Even better, we might want a model that allows granularity in choosing to allow input-independence or only privacy to be degraded in a differentially-private way. Second, the model should allow adversarial influence on the differentially-private leakage. Since a malicious adversary has arbitrary influence over the protocol, and the honest party responds to the adversary's protocol messages, the adversary has potential influence over the leakage. As a simple example, suppose the protocol leaks information L(x, q) about Alice's input x, where q is somehow chosen by the adversary. If for every q, the function L(·, q) is differentially private, then the model should allow such leakage.
Finally, the existing semi-honest definitions are not simulation-based but indistinguishability-based. In the semi-honest setting, these notions are equivalent, but in general they are not for malicious security. In particular, a desirable property of simulation-based security is that it leads to a composability property: if π uses G to securely realizes F, and ρ securely realizes G, then substituting calls to G in π with calls to ρ results in a secure protocol for F. Hence, a simulation-based definition is highly desirable.
Our Model. We choose to address these complications by adding explicit leakage to the ideal functionality in the UC security definition. Figure 1 describes an ideal functionality for securely evaluating a function while also giving some leakage. The adversary's choice of leakage is constrained to some class L of allowable leakage functions (a parameter of the functionality). The functionality allows the corrupt party to obtain leakage on the honest party's input at two different times: both before and after choosing its own input. If one restricts L to contain only pairs of the form (L pre , ⊥) or of the form (⊥, L post ), where ⊥ is overloaded to denote the function ⊥(x) = ⊥ for all x, then one obtains a definition with just one leakage phase. In particular, if the L pre leakage is ⊥, then input independence is guaranteed in a cryptographic sense (i.e., not degraded in a differentially private manner), since the adversary must choose its input based on no information about the honest party's input.
Definition 6. A protocol π securely realizes
The protocol realizes f with -DP leakage if it realizes f with L leakage, where for every
under the appropriate "neighbor" relation for values of x).
For example, in the case of PSI, the neighbor relation is addition/removal of a single item from a party's input set. Secure computation with -DP leakage ensures that an adversary learns only -DP information about the individuals in the honest party's set.
Note that in this model, correctness of the output is still guaranteed in the standard cryptographic sense (e.g., with overwhelming probability).
Interplay Between Cryptographic and DP Guarantees. Our model allows differentially-private leakage (explicitly from the functionality) in addition to negligible simulation error (as part of UC security definition). When the leakage is -DP, it is reasonable to interpret the entire view of the adversary as having ( , δ)-differential privacy 2 , where δ is the negligible error from the UC-security simulation. Standard security corresponds to the case of = 0 and δ negligible.
In order to compare to the original, fully-secure PSI protocol of [26] , we use the same security parameters in our work. In particular, the protocol can fail with probability 2 −40 . The reader who prefers to think of the entire system in terms of ( , δ)-DP can do so with δ = 2 −40 .
PSI Protocol Framework
In this section we describe our PSI protocol framework (i.e., PSI with histogram leakage). The framework is based on the PSI protocol of Rindal & Rosulek [26] , which is the fastest known PSI protocol achieving malicious security.
Overview
We first review the Rindal-Rosulek protocol. At a high level, the protocol works by having the parties first hash their items into bins (with a random hash function). Within each bin, they perform a quadratic-cost PSI protocol on the items assigned to that bin. However, the abstraction boundary is broken slightly by an optimization that combines together some information across all of the bins.
Quadratic PSI. This step of the protocol uses an oblivious encoding functionality, which can be thought of as an oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) or a variant of random oblivious transfer over an exponentially large number of values. The functionality chooses a random function which we denote as x → x . A receiver can learn x for a single, chosen value x, while the sender can compute x for any number of values x. Looking forward, each party will choose n such functions which for j ∈ [n] we denote as x → x B j when Bob is the sender and x → x A j for Alice. Concretely, the encoding protocol uses the OT extension protocol of Orrù, Orsini & Scholl [21] , which is secure in the random oracle model. It achieves a slight relaxation of this functionality where a corrupt sender is allowed to choose the mapping · . This variant functionality is described formally in Figure 2 , and it is sufficient for use in the PSI protocol.
If Alice has n items {x 1 , . . . , x n } and Bob has n items {y 1 , . . . , y n }, they can use this oblivious encoding functionality to perform PSI in the following way:
1. For each x j , the parties perform an instance of the oblivious encoding with Alice acting as receiver, so that Alice learns x j B j . We use · B j to signify that Bob can compute the encoding for any value. 2. Symmetrically, for each y i , the parties perform an oblivious encoding instance in the other direction, with Bob learning y i A i . 3. The parties define n 2 "common encodings" of the form: v
Alice learned in step 1, she computes the n common encodings { x j [21] The protocol continues with Alice sending the (randomly ordered) set of encodings:
Bob can check this set for encodings that are known to him (i.e., all encodings of the form y i * i,j ). Bob computes the protocol output as:
Suppose the encodings · have length λ + 2 log 2 n bits. Then the probability of x j * i,j = y i * i,j for x j = y i is bounded by 2 −λ . Conditioned on this event not happening, the protocol is correct.
To see the security of the protocol, note that the simulator can observe the adversary's inputs when the adversary plays the role of the F encode -receiver. If some x is never used as such an input to F encode , then the adversary could never predict any common encoding of the form x * i,j . In other words, the adversary's input (which the simulator must extract) must be a subset of this set of candidates known to the simulator. In the case of a corrupt Alice, the simulator must further test which of these candidates are represented in the encodings sent in the message E. The details are discussed in Appendix A.
Hashing and Dummy Items. This basic protocol requires only 2n instances of the oblivious encoding functionality (n in each direction), but requires Alice to communicate n 2 encodings. A standard approach to reduce the complexity of a PSI protocol (dating back at least to [10] ) is for parties to first choose 3 a random hash function h : {0, 1} * → [m] and use this function to assign their items into m bins. Then the quadratic-cost protocol can be performed on the items within each bin.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, it is necessary to hide the number of items per bin -in the ideal world, it is not possible to infer the number of items that honest party has that satisfy h(x) = b for a chosen bin b. To obscure this information, the parties add dummy items to each bin until each bin has exactly the worst-case number of items (such a bound can be computed using standard balls-in-bins analysis).
A typical choice of parameters is m = O(n/ log n) bins. In that case, both the expected and worst case (with overwhelming probability) number of items per bin is O(log n). Then the overall cost of the protocol is
However, further optimization is still possible. Let µ be the (padded) size of each bin. As currently described, Alice would send µ encodings for each of her items, including her dummy items! However, it is public information that overall Alice has only n items and hence only nµ encodings corresponding to them. Only the distribution of these dummies within the bins is secret. So the suggestion of [26] is to let Alice gather all nµ non-dummy encodings from all bins, shuffle them, and send them together. Now the encodings must be somewhat longer (the probability of a spurious collision in these encodings has increased), and Bob must lookup candidate encodings in a larger set, rather than in small bin-specific sets. However, the gain in communication makes this optimization an overall improvement to the protocol.
Our Generalization and Details
As mentioned in Section 1.1, our modification of the Rindal-Rosulek protocol is to release some differentially private information about the number of items in each bin. We begin by defining the properties we require:
For a set of items X hashed into m bins by h, the load of bin i is:
The load of all bins can be written as a vector:
where the probability is taken over the randomness of L and the choice of h.
One can think of the function L h (X) = (µ, . . . , µ) to be the load-overestimate used in [26] , where µ is an upper bound on bin size computed using balls-in-bins analysis.
Our generalization of Rindal-Rosulek is parameterized by a load overestimate L. Roughly speaking, after choosing the hash function h: -Alice hashes her items X into bins, computes the load of each bin (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = Ld h (X), and an over- 
however [26] security proof / simulation breaks down in the case where Alice has more items in a bin than Bob (we discuss this fact in Appendix A). We must therefore have Bob compute c i = max{ a i , b i } and add dummy items so that the load in the bins is ( c 1 , . . . , c m ). 4 4 Note that Alice's privacy depends only on the load overestimate that she computes; it does not depend on any property of Bob's load overestimate (and vice-versa). An adversary hurts only itself by reporting a different overestimate.
Parameters: σ is the bit-length of the parties' items. n is the size of the honest parties' sets. n > n is the allowed size of the corrupt party's set.
-On input (Receive, sid, Y ) from Bob where Y ⊆ {0, 1} σ , ensure that |Y | ≤ n if Bob is honest, and that |Y | ≤ n if Bob is corrupt. Give output (bob-input, sid) to Alice. -Thereafter, on input (Send, sid, X) from Alice where X ⊆ {0, 1} σ , likewise ensure that |X| ≤ n if Alice is honest, and that |X| ≤ n if Alice is corrupt. Give output (Ouput, sid, X ∩ Y ) to Bob. In [26] , it is public information that Alice will have nµ total non-dummy encodings, since each bin contains exactly µ items. In our case, Alice will have a i c i nondummy encodings. She cannot simply send the nondummy encodings as in [26] since the number of these items is indeed sensitive to her true bin-load. To protect this information, we need a differentially-private overestimate of this inner product: In our generalization, Alice computes a differentiallyprivate 5 inner-product overestimate e = I ((a 1 , . . . , a m ), ( c 1 , . . . , c m ) ). She includes the nondummy encodings in a set E, adds random values until |E| = e, and finally sends the (permuted) contents of E to Bob.
The formal details of the protocol are given in Figure 4 . Unsurprisingly, the security proof is extremely similar to that of [26] . For the sake of completeness, we present the self-contained proof in Appendix A. Roughly speaking, the only differences from [26] are that (1) the number of items per bin is changed to be inputdependent; (2) the number of common encodings sent by Alice is input-dependent. However, if the simulator is given these values (e.g., as leakage from the functionality), then simulation proceeds just as in [26] .
Parameters: X is Alice's input, Y is Bob's input, where X, Y ⊆ {0, 1} σ . m is the number of bins. The protocol uses instances of F encode with input length σ, and output length λ + 2 log(nµ), where λ is the security parameter and µ is an upper bound on the number of items in a bin. Finally, a load-overestimate function L and an inner-product overestimate function I. 
Recall that in our security model, the adversary is allowed to choose the leakage function from a class of allowable functions. In the case of a corrupt Bob, that choice includes the choice of c i 's. Using the efficient F encode protocol of [21] , the entire protocol can be instantiated in the random oracle model assuming UC-secure oblivious transfer. [26] also present a less efficient standard-model instantiation that is secure assuming UC-secure oblivious transfer and a secure PRG. Our implementation uses the random-oracle instantiation.
Adversary's set size.. The adversary may "underreport" the number of items it actually has. For example, we expect a i and c i to be significant over-estimates of the true number of items, but a corrupt Alice could use a i different non-dummy items in the calls to F encode for bin #i (similarly, Bob could use c i distinct items).
This fact is reflected in the ideal functionality (Figure 3) , where honest parties agree to use sets of size n, but a corrupt party is allowed to actually provide a set of n > n items for some bound n . We stress that the original protocol of [26] has the same property, and the same analysis of the n bound in [26] applies here: briefly, with overwhelming probability we have n = O(n) with a small hidden constant factor, e.g. 3.
Choosing Appropriate Leakage
In this section we introduce private load overestimates and inner-product overestimates that can be used in the PSI protocol to provide different flavors of differential privacy. We begin with standard differential privacy and then consider a variant called distributional differential privacy.
Differentially private load overestimate
Recall that Alice & Bob assign each item z to a bin h(z) specified by a random hash function. The load of the bins Ld h (X) leaks information about a party's input set X, hence our protocol instructs the parties to reveal a load overestimate L h (X) instead. We introduce more accurate and differentially-private load overestimates. The more accurate L h is, the fewer dummy items need to be added, and the cheaper the protocol becomes.
As a reference point, one can think of the fully malicious-secure protocol of [26] as using the overestimate L h (X) = (µ, µ, · · · µ), where µ is computed such that:
Pr
The fact that this is an overestimate follows from the union bound. With m bins, the probability of some bin having more than µ items is at most 2 −λ . This overestimate mechanism is independent of the input, and hence leaks nothing.
Simple Laplacian mechanism.
A simple approach is to add Laplacian noise and also add a fixed "safety buffer" z, setting a i = a i + Lap 1/ 1 + z. The buffer z is chosen so that z + Lap 1/ 1 is positive (i.e., a i ≥ a i ) with high probability -a condition that does not depend on a i . The mechanism is described formally in Figure 5 . Figure 5 is 1 -DP and is an overestimate of the true load with probability at least 1 − 2 −λ .
Theorem 11. The load overestimate in
Proof. Differential privacy follows from the privacy of the Laplacian mechanism, and the fact that adding z to each component is input-independent post-processing. z is chosen so that Pr[ a i ≥ a i ] < 1/m2 λ for each i. By a union bound over the m bins, we have Pr[∃i :
This is the mechanism used in [12] for private record linkage, and also in other contexts unrelated to PSI (e.g., by Kellaris et al. [16] ).
Our experiments show that this overestimate mechanism only gives a modest improvement to the PSI protocol. For example, with n = 2 20 items, m = 2 20 /12 bins, = 1, and λ = 40, the safety buffer is z = 38.4.
To put that into perspective, 98% of bins have less than 20 items. (See Figure 7 for a comparison to our new mechanism for these parameters.)
In [12] , only relatively large bins (i.e., with many items) are considered. Since the effect of the safety buffer is additive, it has less of an effect for such large bins. However, in the RR17 PSI protocol, bins are much smaller in order to optimize the tradeoff between number of bins and the quadratic costs within each bin.
Recall that the RR17 protocol computes a worstcase bin load µ and then treats all bins as if they have µ items (µ = 51 for the example parameters above). For low and small expected load, the safety buffer mechanism can lead to many bins whose reported size exceeds µ. However, it is safe to truncate all overestimates at µ, since the computation of µ is input-independent. In doing so, the bins are never larger than they are in the fully-secure RR17 protocol.
Improved Bayesian-update mechanism. We refine the Laplacian mechanism by taking into account the prior knowledge Alice and Bob have about the distribution of the true load. In particular, they know that that items are mapped to bins uniformly, so the load of each bin follows a binomial distribution parameterized by n items and success probability p = 1/m.
We want Alice and Bob to use the differentially private bin size estimates not to replace their binomial distribution priors, but rather to update them in the standard Bayesian sense.
Suppose β is sampled from some known distribution (e.g., binomial) D. For any threshold τ , we can compute Pr β←D [β > τ ]. After getting some partial information about the actual value of β in the form of a ← β + Lap 1/ 1 , we can update this prior distribution to compute a more accurate probability:
Such probabilities can be computed via a straightforward Bayesian calculation from the known distributions D and Lap. For each concrete value ofâ, we get a different posterior distribution over β. Hence, for each value ofâ, and for any desired cutoff probability p, it is possible to compute the minimum τ such that
In practice, the mappingâ → τ can be computed as a lookup table hard-coded into the protocol. When such a threshold τ is computed for every bin (with respect to the appropriate binomial distribution), we get the load overestimate described formally in Figure 6 .
compute We use n = 2 20 items, m = n/12 bins, = 1, and λ = 40.
Because the expected bin size is 12, the most likely Laplacian estimate is also 12, so the most common overestimate is 33. In the fully-secure RR17 protocol with same parameters, all bins are taken to have size µ = 51. When using the simple Laplacian method (with same and λ), the safety buffer alone is 38.4. Figure 6 In Figure 7 we show a concrete example of a lookup table for load overestimates, for typical parameters encountered in the PSI protocol context. This approach does indeed lead to significantly tighter load overestimates compared to the simple approach of adding a safety buffer to the differentially-private estimate.
Theorem 12. The load overestimate in

Differentially private inner product overestimate
The protocol requires an inner product overestimate function I, to upper bound the number of masks that Alice must send to Bob. The number of non-dummy masks that Alice has is I = i a i b i , but this cannot be released exactly since a i is sensitive. In this case, the simple mechanism involving Laplacian noise and a safety buffer is good enough. Taking the b i values as constant, we view I as a function of Alice's input set X:
It is clear that the sensitivity of
Hence, adding Laplacian noise with parameter ∆I/ 2 is sufficient for 2 -differential privacy. As before, we compute z such that Pr[Lap ∆I/ 2 < −z] < 1/2 λ . The final overestimate function is therefore:
Theorem 13. I above is 2 -differentially private and is an overestimate of I with probability at least
The reason this simpler mechanism is sufficient here (rather than the Bayesian-update mechanism) is due to the scale of the numbers involved. With typical parameters, the load in a single bin is roughly the same magnitude as the safety buffer z. So adding z to the load of each bin has a huge effect. However, the inner product I is, e.g., 5 orders of magnitude larger than the load of a single bin. So adding z to this value has minimal effect.
Allocating the privacy budget. We have described the load overestimate from the previous section to have privacy parameter 1 , and the inner-product overestimate to have privacy parameter 2 . The overall PSI protocol will leak both of these values, leading to overall differential privacy parameter = 1 + 2 by the composition theorem for DP.
If a privacy budget of is desired for the entire PSI protocol, this budget must be divided between these two mechanisms somehow. We found it best to allocate the vast majority of the privacy budget to the load overestimates, letting 2 be quite small in comparison to 1 (e.g., 1 = 0.99 and 2 = 0.01 ).
Distributional-differentially-private load overestimate
Say the receiver was to take the histogram of hash values and announce for each bin whether or not it was larger than the average bin size n/m. This would allow removing most of the dummies in roughly half of the bins, but it is a deterministic function of the histogram so can't possibly be differentially private (for any ). However, actually exploiting such information would require the adversary to have significant knowledge about the set of items -for example, knowing with certainty n/m items that happen to be placed in the same bin, with another target item of interest also being mapped to that bin. Then the inclusion/exclusion of the target item will change whether this bin is above/below the threshold.
If one is working in a use case where this sort of side information is unlikely, then we can use more nuanced notions of privacy to give better efficiency. In particular, we consider here distributional differential privacy (DDP), introduced by Bassily et al. [1] . 6 Rather than considering the worst case over all possible databases, DDP treats the database itself as a random variable, modeling adversarial uncertainty. 6 DDP is a special case of coupled-worlds privacy. Coupledworlds privacy has additional parameters and allows for more flexibility in choosing the most relevant privacy definition for a particular use case. Here we use DDP because it is the most straightforward instantiation, the one we feel is most wellmotivated here, and the one that is most analogous to differential privacy. where X i is the i th item of the database and X −i is the database with that row removed. 7 Inuitively, the definition guarantees to an individual that, given the adversary's present knowledge/uncertainty, the mechanism will output roughly the same distribution of values whether or not that individual's data is included in the database. As a result, the inclusion of this data does not reveal anything about this value beyond the leakage which is parameterized by . The definition is less stringent than differential privacy, more narrowly tailored to a subset of all possible auxiliary information. But this is not without ramifications. If the adversary knows more about the database than ∆ allows, then there is no guarantee of privacy.
(Fortunately, if the adversary knows less there is no problem.) Additionally, DDP does not have automatic composition in the way that differential privacy does, so it cannot safely be combined with other private data releases without a case-by-case analysis. The nuances of this privacy definition can be quite subtle, and we refer the reader to [1] for a more detailed discussion.
Deterministic rounding mechanism.. We consider a load-overestimate mechanism in which the bin size is rounded up to either t − 1 or the a-priori maximum bin size -whichever is closer. Hence, for each bin we reveal whether its load is in {0, . . . , t − 1} or {t, . . .}. The mechanism is described formally in Figure 8 . Figure 8 is an overestimate of the true load with probability at least
Theorem 15. The load overestimate in
Proof. By construction, a i cannot be an underestimate in the case that a i = t − 1. Hence, L fails to be an overestimate only in the case that some a i exceeds µ.
By the definition of µ and a standard union bound, the probability of such an a i existing is at most 1/2 λ .
Understanding the concrete privacy of the mechanism is not easy. As mentioned, the analysis depends on the choice of threshold t and the characterization of the adversary's auxiliary information (∆). A simple formula relating these parameters to the privacy of the mechanism is not known, and any kind of meaningful formula/bound is left as important open work on this mechanism.
To give some sense of the privacy guarantee, we have analyzed the mechanism's guarantees for a specific set of parameters: n = 2 16 items, m = n/10 = 6553 bins, and threshold t = 13. The analysis considers the case where the adversary's auxiliary information of X leaves h(X) uniform. More formally, ∆ contains all joint distributions over (X, Z) such that the conditional distribution h(X) | Z is uniform in {1, . . . , m} n .
Theorem 16. With ∆ as above, and n = 2 16 , m = n/10, t = 13, the mechanism from Figure 8 gives (∆, = 0.33, δ = 5 × 10 −5 )-DDP.
The calculations are quite tedious and given in Appendix B. As we discuss there, increasing n (keeping m = n/10) can only decrease and δ (i.e., improve privacy), as the relevant binomial distributions converge more closely to a normal distribution.
Relaxing the assumption on adversarial knowledge. The analysis assumes that every h(x) of the honest party is random given the adversary's auxiliary information. When the adversary does in fact have some information about some of the items in the set, the DDP privacy of the mechanism is not completely compromised. Information about items that are placed outside the bin in question (the bin into which the target item is placed) is similar in nature to decreasing n by that amount. Information about items that are placed in the same bin as the target item is similar to reducing t by that amount. That means privacy will degrade rapidly when the adversary knows (or has significant certainty about) several values that would all hash to the same bin under the random function h. The chances of this are low unless the adversary knows a large amount about the input set. However, while we are confident of these general statements, quantifying the privacy guarantees with a specific choice of adversarily knowledge would (given the techniques discussed here) require re-running the simulation in a slightly more complex way. 
Experiments
We now explore the concrete tradeoff between differentially private leakage and performance (computation and communication) in the Rindal-Rosulek PSI protocol. We will see that our protocol offers a smooth tradeoff, with performance improving by as much as 60% for some leakage settings.
The baseline for comparison was the Rindal-Rosulek protocol as-is. We obtained the implementation from the authors and modified it to support our variations on reported bin sizes and number of encodings in the final message, as outlined in Section 4. One can think of the unmodified Rindal-Rosulek protocol as the special case of our generalization, with = 0 (i.e., no leakage at all). The F encode functionality is instantiated with the construction of [21] .
With ran all protocols on a single server similar to that used by [26] with the difference that we only consider single-threaded performance. We stress that the only difference in experiments is the bin size and number of final-round encodings, resulting from our differentially private leakage. The benchmark machine has 256GB of RAM and 36 physical cores at 2.6 GHz where a single core is assigned to each party. Two network settings were considered, 1) the LAN setting where latency is less than a millisecond and throughput is 10Gbps of which about 1% was actually utilized. 2) the WAN setting with a 80ms round trip latency and 40Mbps throughput. Both parties run on the same physical machine, communicating via a simulated LAN achieved using a Linux kernel loop-back device and the parameters listed above. Performance numbers are reported using the wall-clock time and include network latency. For each setting of parameters, we report the average of 5 runs.
Parameters. In Figure 9 we report the performance of our protocol for various choices of differential privacy parameter . Recall that there are two pieces of differentially-private leakage: the overestimate of the bin loads, and the overestimate of the number of encodings (inner product). Given an overall privacy budget of we found it advantageous to allocate the lion's share to the histogram mechanism. The row in the table corresponding to privacy budget corresponds to 0.99 -DP load overestimate and 0.01 -DP inner-product overesti- Fig. 10 . The effect of different distributional differential privacy parameters on our protocol performance, compared to the baseline RR17 protocol which has no leakage. All of our DDP protocol executions use the mechanism with threshold t = 13.
mate for the sender. The receiver uses the entire privacy budget for the bin-load overestimate. We consider both the simple Laplacian overestimate mechanism and our improved Bayesian-update mechanism.
The main parameters that effects performance, apart from , is the expected bin load n/m. This parameter controls the relative number of dummy items that occupy each bin. More items per bin leads to fewer dummy items proportionally, but more communication because of the quadratic number of encodings sent in the last protocol message. These trade-offs must be balanced. In [26] , the preferred value of n/m was found to be 4. In our setting, we have fewer dummy items thanks to differential privacy, and we found n/m between 10 and 16 minimizes latency. The ideal parameter n/m also depends on the network latency (i.e., WAN vs LAN setting). In both our experiments and RR17, the ideal value of n/m was determined empirically. For vastly different network settings, a different n/m value may be preferable.
Smooth privacy-performance tradeoff. Focusing on the case of n = 2 20 items, in the LAN setting = 4 results in a speed reduction of 63%; = 2 gives 53% reduction; = 1 gives 41% reduction; = 0.5 gives 33% reduction. In the WAN setting, where communication is more of a bottleneck, = 4 reduces communication by 62%, = 2 by 50%, = 1 by 35%, and = 0.5 by 22%.
We attempted to determine a value of beyond which our protocol gives only marginal improvement over the fully-secure protocol. Experimentally, we found that the improvement drops off for ≤ 0.05, where the performance is within 5% of the fully secure protocol. The difference in cost between the DP and fully-secure protocols depends strongly on n/m (expected load) and only minimally on n. The preferred choice of n/m parameter is quite stable for all reasonable values of n that could be considered for PSI. We therefore believe that the threshold of = 0.05 is representative of our limit for all n.
Improvement over simple Laplacian mechanism.
For the case of n = 2 20 we also implemented the simple Laplacian load overestimate that involves a large safety buffer. For higher ∈ {2, 4}, our Bayesian method improves over the basic approach by 14-18%. But for more demanding ∈ {0.5, 1}, our approach gives an improvement of roughly 25%.
Distributional Differential Privacy. We also explored allowing DDP leakage, as explained in Section 5.3. In this setting, the sender can set a threshold t, and for each bin announce whether it contains t or more items. Then each bin is treated as if it has either t − 1 items or the worst-case number of items (i.e., whatever the fully-secure protocol would do).
Because the analysis of this mechanism depends heavily on the adversary's auxiliary information about the inputs, we only propose using it for the sender. The receiver eventually learns the intersection, which becomes side information that cannot be predicted in advance (i.e., when the privacy parameters are being determined). In these experimends, the sender uses the deterministic-rounding mechanism and the receiver uses our Bayesian-updating mechanism.
Due to the difficulty in obtaining concrete quantitative bounds on the privacy level, we consider only one privacy setting for the DDP case. Specifically, for n ∈ {2 16 , 2 20 } items, and m = n/10 bins, we let the sender announce whether each bin has less than t = 13 items. Following the analysis in Section 5.3, we conservatively estimate that this mechanism provides ( = 0.33, δ = 0.00005)-DDP.
The performance of the DDP mechanism is reported in Figure 10 . We observe that this result in decreased communication/running time in all cases except when compared to our standard DP protocol with = 4. For instance, with n = 2 20 and a = 0.33 our DDP protocol is 18% faster than the 0.5-DP protocol. The decrease in communication is of particular note for the WAN setting where communication is the main bottleneck. However, even in the LAN setting we observe a considerable decrease in running time.
Future Work
Looking more closely at our protocol, the differentially private leakage is on a random histogram -i.e., a random function applied to the private input set. Indeed, the nature of this leakage motivates the choice of distributional DP -rather than arguing that an attacker has limited information about some of the private items, it is enough to say that the attacker's auxiliary information about the items is sufficiently limited to make most of the hashes look random.
An interesting future direction is to extend differential privacy definitions and mechanisms to give better accuracy in such a setting -i.e., where we are trying to sanitize information that is already somewhat "random information" about the private inputs.
The most challenging part of our analysis is obtaining good concrete bounds for the DDP privacy analysis. We obtain estimates using intensive computations, but analytical bounds would be more convenient.
There is also an issue that the DDP mechanism can only be applied to one party's histogram. This stems from the fact that DDP does not automatically compose with auxiliary information -yet, the PSI output itself will become auxiliary information but is not known at the time that DDP parameters are chosen. A better understanding of this composition problem would be helpful, since our DDP mechanism gives better performance.
[ 
A Security Proof
In this section we prove the security of the (leaky) PSI protocol ( Figure 4 ). The proof is essentially the same as the one in [26] , and is presented here with many aspects identical to [26] . The modifications have to do with the leakage handling in the simulator, which is highlighted below.
Proof. We start with the case of a corrupt Bob. The simulator must extract Bob's input, and simulate the messages in the protocol. We first describe the simulator:
The simulator plays the role of the ideal F encode functionality. The simulator obtains leakage ( ( c 1 , . . . , cm) ) from the functionality and pad E with random values until it has size e. The simulator then sends E (randomly permuted) to the adversary.
To show that this is a valid simulation, we consider a series of hybrids.
Hybrid 0 The first hybrid is the real interaction where
Alice honestly uses her input X, and F encode is implemented honestly.
Observe Bob's commands to F encode of the form (Encode, (sid, A, d, p . This encoding is therefore distributed independent of everything else in the simulation. In particular, the common encoding of the form
, which is added to the set E, is uniform. We therefore modify the hybrid in the following way. In Step 4a, simulated Alice generates encodings for the set E only for items in the intersection Z = X ∩Ỹ , instead of X as before. She still pads the set E to contain e items, as before. By the above argument, the adversary's view is identically distributed in this modified hybrid.
We can see that the final hybrid uses the contents X only in the following way: It uses the bin-load overestimate L h (X); it uses the result of X ∩Ỹ for some setỸ that it computes; it uses the inner-product overestimate ( c 1 , . . . , c m ) ). Hence, this hybrid corresponds to our final simulator, where we obtain leakage from the functionality, sendỸ to the ideal F PSI functionality and receive X ∩Ỹ in response.
We now turn our attention to a corrupt Alice. In this case the simulator must simply extract Alice's effective input (Alice receives no output from F PSI ). The simulator is defined as follows: 
where the encodings are obtained by playing the role of F encode . The simulator sends X * to the F PSI functionality. Hybrid 2 Note that in this hybrid, Bob's output is computed as specified in Step 4c. We then modify the interaction so that Bob removes all output items which are not inX. The hybrids differ only in the event that simulated Bob computes an output in
Step 4c that includes an item y ∈X. This happens
where Bob places y in position p of bin d = h(y). Since y ∈X, however, the encoding y B d,p is distributed uniformly. The length of encodings is chosen so that the overall probability of this event (across all choices of y ∈X) is at most 2 −λ . Hence the modification is indistinguishable.
Hybrid 3
We modify the hybrid in the following way.
When building the hash table, the simulated Bob uses X instead of his actual input Y . Each x ∈X is inserted with multiplicity c(x). Then he computes the protocol output as specified in Step 4c; call it X * . This is not what the simulator gives as output -rather, it gives X * ∩ Y as output instead.
The hashing process is different only in the fact that items of Y \X are excluded and replaced in the hash table with items ofX \ Y (i.e., items in Y ∩X are treated exactly the same way). Note that the definition ofX ensures that the hash table can hold all of these items without overflowing. Also, this change is local to Step 4c, where the only thing that happens is Bob computing his output. However, by the restriction added in Hybrid 2 , items in Y \X can never be included in X * . Similarly, by the step added in this hybrid, items inX \ Y can never be included in the simulator's output. So this change has no effect on the adversary's view (which includes this final output).
The final hybrid works as follows. A simulator interacts with the adversary and at some point computes a set X * , without the use of Y . Then the simulated Bob's output is computed as X * ∩ Y . Hence, this hybrid corresponds to our final simulator, where we send X * to the ideal F PSI functionality, which sends output X * ∩ Y to ideal Bob.
B Calculations for DDP Leakage
We assume (for now) that the sender knows nothing at all about the hashes of the receiver's inputs. 8 Note that this does not mean that the receiver's inputs are completely unknown, just that they have sufficient uncertainty that their hashes under the random hashing function appear uniform. Note also that this is an assumption we can make regarding only the sender's knowledge of the receiver's input, because the PSI protocol itself gives output to the receiver, which is auxiliary information about the sender's input that violates this assumption.
We now wish to compute the privacy parameters and δ for the deterministic rounding mechanism with threshold t. We first want to fix a given output S and consider the following ratio:
We note first of all that the calculation will be the same for all choices of i and j, so we assume without loss of generality that i = n and j = m. We also leave the conditioning implicit, since from this point forward all probabilities are conditioned on h(X n ) = m. We now want to examine the same ratio, with the following simplified notation:
We first consider the case where m ∈ S, i.e. the case where ρ ≥ 1. Let S −m = S \ {m} and let C m be a random variable equal to the size of bin m. We can then rewrite the numerator. 
We then note that all sets S of a given size are equally likely values of H (for any choice of subscripts), so setting s = |S| we can rewrite the fraction in the above equation as We must then also consider the case where m ∈ S and ρ < 1. The analysis of the denominator is unchanged, but the numerator must be handled separately in this case. Luckily it proceeds quite similarly. We have Estimating concrete parameters. If we knew how to compute an exact probability distribution for |H n,m | we would now be finished. The distribution of |H n,m | approximates a normal distribution. The value of ρ is worst when s is far from its expected value, so we could simply define an interval [α, β] and compute the values of ρ with s = α and s = β and set = max | ln(ρ)|. That would bound the ratio for all values in [α, β] and we could then compute the probability that s ∈ [α, β] and set δ to that value. By adjusting α and β we could control a tradeoff between and δ. Unfortunately we cannot find an efficiently computable closed-form expression for the distribution of |H n,m |, and the normal approximation, while pretty good, is unreliable for very precise estimates of the extreme tails needed for δ calculations. So we instead resort to experimental estimation of these values. We run a simulation of throwing n − t (resp. n − 1) balls into m − 1 (resp. m) bins many times, each time noting the number of bins ending up with at least t balls.
Concretely, computational limitations meant we could only run a large simulation for a single choice of parameters, and not for the largest values of n. We choose n = 2 16 , m = n/10 = 6553, and t = 13 (meaning that each bucket is said to be either in [0, 12] or [12, ∞)). We were able to run a simulation with 20 million data points. On average 1366 bins will be over the threshold, and our data gave us confidence to say that by choosing [α, β] = [1257, 1473] we achieve delta of approximately 1/500, 000. In principle should be worst near the extreme tails, but we found that as we moved to the extreme tails we hit a point where our data was too sparse to make accurate estimates before we hit a point where was increasing. In the entire range where we have sufficient data, variation in is minimal and the maximum value it takes is 0.33. This is a lower value that we were using in the differentially private protocol, so we should ideally accept a worse value in exchange for an even better δ value, but our data is insufficient to quantify the tradeoff beyond this point.
We note also that while simulations with larger n will take even more computational power, it is clear that the privacy parameters will only improve, as the distribution of |H n,m | is still approximately normal but now with a larger standard deviation and therefore a better ratio between adjacent values. We therefore consider the protocol with m = n/10 and t = 13 to be (0.33, 5×10 −5 )-DDP in the n = 2 20 case as well. In reality, the parameters are probably significantly better than this.
Because we saw no sign of increasing in the range of values we could estimate, we believe these estimates are in fact much worse than what is really achieved. A successful theoretical analysis of these parameters, rather than relying on empirical estimation, would be a highly desirable result of future work.
